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Abstract Online examinations are an integral component of online learning environ-
ments and research studies have identified academic dishonesty as a critical threat to the
credibility of such examinations. Academic dishonesty exists in many forms. Collusion
is seen as a major security threat, wherein a student invites a third party for help or to
impersonate him or her in an online examination. This work aims to investigate the
authentication of students using text-based and image-based challenge questions. The
study reported in this paper involved 70 online participants from nine countries
completing a five week online course and simulating an abuse case scenario. The
results of a usability analysis suggested that i) image-based questions are more usable
than text-based questions (p < 0.01) and ii) using a more flexible data entry method
increased the usability of text-based questions (p < 0.01). An impersonation abuse
scenario was simulated to test the influence of sharing with different database sizes.
The findings revealed that iii) an increase in the number of questions shared for
impersonation increased the success of an impersonation attack and the results showed
a significant linear trend (p < 0.01). However, the number of correct answers decreased
when the attacker had to memorize and answer the questions in an invigilated online
examination or their response to questions was timed. The study also revealed that iv)
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an increase in the size of challenge question database decreased the success of an
impersonation attack (p < 0.01).
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1 Introduction
Educational institutions are increasingly moving toward the use of online
learning systems for the delivery of courses. In typical online learning environ-
ments, students interact with learning resources and take examinations from
remote locations which raise the security concerns of stakeholders. With the
increasing demand for online learning, there is a rising concern about the
integrity of the online examination process (Watson and Sottile 2010). Aca-
demic dishonesty is one of the major security threats which have been a widely
researched area. It has been reported as a serious challenge, due to vulnerable
authentication approaches and the difficulty of verifying the identity of remote
students. Face-to-face invigilation can be expensive and logistically challenging
in dispersed geographical locations. However, in high-stake examinations many
educational institutions prefer invigilated examinations to the use of online
examinations due to the difficulty in the authentication of a remote user with
no face-to-face interaction (Moini and Madni 2009).
Academic dishonesty can take place in a number of different ways. However, the
work presented in this paper investigates an impersonation abuse case, wherein stu-
dents invite third party impersonators to take the test on their behalf. From this scenario,
students take advantage of weak authentication mechanisms and the absence of
physical verification.
This paper presents the findings of an empirical study conducted in an
online course with remote international participants. The work focuses on
research that aims to investigate the authentication of examinees via the use
of a challenge questions approach (Ullah et al. 2012a). The authors developed
a profile based method, which implements challenge questions and login-
identifier and password. Besides the traditional text-based challenge questions,
this study implemented multiple-choice image-based questions for the evalua-
tion of usability and security. Using this method, a student profile is built and
consolidated during the teaching and learning process. A subset of profile
information is used for authenticating students in online examinations. This
study aimed to:
& examine the usability of text-based and image-based questions in a real online
learning course.
& examine the effect of sharing different numbers of challenge questions in an
impersonation using varying database sizes.
& examine the effect of using memory, printed and electronic sources when answering
challenge questions during impersonation.
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2 Background and related work
2.1 Academic dishonesty and collusion
The threat level of collusion in online examinations is different from other online
applications such as banking where implicit collusion is unlikely to happen
(Rabkin 2008).
In his earlier work, Ercole et al. (2002) studied collusion in a comparative
empirical study using multiple choice questions in face-to-face and online
examinations. It is one of the major security threats (Laubscher et al. 2005)
which challenges the validity of online examinations (Carter et al. 2003). It can
be classified in the following categories based on its occurrence in different
scenarios (Ullah et al. 2016):
& Impersonation (Operated by a Third Party Impersonator): This type of attack
happens when a student invites a third party helper to impersonate and take an
online test on his or her behalf. Impersonation can happen in different ways
described below:
– Email (Asynchronous): A student shares access credentials with a third party
impersonator via email asynchronously, when they are unable to interact
during an online examination in real-time due to implementation of locking
and monitoring mechanisms (Kitahara et al. 2011).
– Smart Phone (Real-time): Students are authenticated using a dynamic mech-
anism e.g. code texted on a mobile phone in real-time. To circumvent this
security, a student and a third party share access credential in real time via
instant messaging e.g. Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, Phone, SMS (Church and De
Oliveira 2013) etc.
– Remote Desktop Sharing: In this case, a student logs in to an online test and
shares his or her screen with an impersonator remotely.
& Abetting (Operated by a Student Aided by a Third Party): A student takes an online
test, while a third party helper shares answers. This type of attack can happen in the
different ways described below:
– Same Location: A student takes a test while a third party helps with solving the
exam questions based in the same location (Rowe 2004).
– Remote Location: A student takes an online test, while a third party helps with
solving the exam questions from a remote location via different communica-
tion means (Wheeler et al. 2003; Hart and Friesner 2004).
Given that security measures such as Bsecure browser^ can be implemented to
mitigate instant messaging (on computer), Internet browser access and remote
desktop sharing during an examination session (Kitahara et al. 2011), a
student may still be able to share access credentials with a third party before
an online test.
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2.2 Authentication approaches
The conventional authentication approaches fall into three categories based on Bwhat
you know^ e.g. password and secret information Bwhat you have?^ e.g. a smart card
and Bwhat you are^ e.g. biometrics (Jin et al. 2004). These methods are driven by
knowledge, objects and human characteristics. In the light of the literature review and
the benefits and limitations of various authentication approaches, the following criteria
were framed to evaluate an accessible, cost effective, secure and useable authentication
feature in the context of online examination:
& Accessibility: To ensure that the method can be used and accessed by a wide range
of online participants using standard input devices. This frees users from a need to
have access to special purpose devices that can limit implementation. Advances in
mobile technology increase demand for accessible authentication approaches.
& Cost Effectiveness: The need for a cost effective approach is essential and this factor
relates to the cost of development, implementation and maintenance. Bailie and
Jortberg (2009) state that cost is an important consideration for technical and
academic professionals in designing identity verification.
& Security: It is important to ensure that a method provides adequate protection to
online examinations against the identified threats.
& Usability: Security mechanisms can only offer the intended protection, if usable. It
is important to ensure that a method is reliable in terms usability. It describes the
ability of authentication mechanisms to meet usability standards. The common
attributes defined by the International Organization for Standards (ISO) (Iso9241-
11 1998) which contributes to the usability includes efficiency and effectiveness.
Following is a review of traditional authentication features in light of the above
criteria.
2.2.1 Knowledge-based authentication
Knowledge-based features employ the method of verifying users by matching one or
more secrets supplied by an individual against data associated with the same individual
(Chen and Liginlal 2008). The login-identifier, password and challenge question
methods are commonly known as knowledge-based features. This is a widely accept-
able approach because of its simplicity, availability and accessibility on a wide range of
platforms (Hayashi et al. 2011). It is a low cost and preferred authentication method
implemented in a majority of secure systems due to simple administration requirements
(Hafiz et al. 2008).
However, the method may not prevent collusion attacks as passwords and personal
information can be easily shared.
2.3 Challenge question authentication
Challenge question authentication is a knowledge-based feature, which is widely seen
as a credential recovery technique (Just and Aspinall 2009a; Schechter et al. 2009).
This method has been used as a second factor feature and employed for customer
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verification in online and telephone banking (Rabkin 2008; Just and Aspinall 2012). It
can be a cost effective and accessible approach to cover a large online population.
However, the reliability of challenge questions is dependent upon the context of use
and choosing usable and secure questions (Just and Aspinall 2009b; Ullah et al. 2012b).
The following section presents an analysis of the previous studies on challenge
questions approach.
2.3.1 Previous research
Table 1 shows usability and security analysis of the previous studies on challenge
questions authentication. In their influential work, Haga and Zviran (1990; Zviran and
Haga 1993) investigated the effectiveness of text-based questions with several user
groups. Their findings revealed participants reproduced correct answers to 70% opinion
based and 74% fact based questions. However, their earlier study (Zviran and Haga
1990) showed that participants who were close family or friends correctly guessed
answers to 33–39%. Research studies conducted by Just and Aspinall (2009a, c)
revealed that 75 and 82% answers were correctly produced by participants. In their
study (Just and Aspinall 2009a), Just and Aspinall reported that, of the 117 challenge
questions asked, 88 (75%) of the total answers were recalled exactly while 21 (18%)
had different punctuation/capitalization (typically performed when registering
answers), and 8 (7%) were completely different citing memorability issue in a
span of 28 days. The authors identified that memorability issue was 8 (7%)
which was higher than the password memorability of 4.28% reported by
(Florencio and Herley 2007). Just and Aspinall performed analysis of security
level against blind guessing, focused guessing and observation attacks. Blind
guessing is a brute force attack where attacker has no knowledge of the
questions. In focus guessing, attacker can read and understand the question in order
to guess the answer from a relevant search space. Security findings of their study
indicate low security level for 5 of their 60 questions. Schechter et al. (2009) investigated
Table 1 Challenge questions: previous studies
Study
Usability Security
S. no Efficiency Effectiveness Guessing
1 Zviran and Haga (1990, 1993) NA 70–74% 33–39%
2 Just and Aspinall (2009c) NA 82% 8.3% Low
3 Just and Aspinall (2009a) NA 75% 46% Low
4 Schetcher et al. (2009) NA 80% 10–13%
5 Ullah et al. (2014a) 15.7 s 58–76% 12%/29%
6 Bailie and Jortberg (2009) NA 92% NA
7 Renaud and Just (2010) NA 68% NA
8 Renaud and Just (2010) NA 77% 38%
9 Babic et al. (2009) 0 s 2.23 (1–3) NA
10 Ullah et al. (2015) 0 s 68% NA
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text-based questions widely used by corporate email services includingMicrosoft, AOL,
Google, and Yahoo. Schetcher found that participants were able to answer 80% of their
questions correctly; however, family and friends of participants were able to guess 10%
of answers. Also, 13% of answers could be guessed within five attempts, which includes
guessing the most popular answers of other participants. Bailie and Jortberg (2009)
collected participants information from the US consumer database and created 150–300
challenge questions for each participants. The findings showed 92% correct answers
which is the highest rate in all previous studies for text based questions. The collection of
personal information could be a challenging task which may as well pose privacy
concerns for wider implementation world-wide. To address the memorability issue,
Renaud and Just (2010) proposed associative picture based cues with multiple choice
answers, which achieved a 13% increase in the memorability with 77% correct
answers. However, the security analysis revealed that 38% of the times, answers
were guessed by close friends. The picture-based questions were related with
participants’ day to day activities. In the guessing attack, participants were
asked to attribute characteristics to a person and associate to a well-known
location. Babic et al. (2009) implemented activity based questions for authen-
tication. They utilized a memorability scale (3 being easy to recall the answer
and 1 being the opposite) and scored 2.23 correct answers. Ullah et al. (2015)
implemented activity based questions in an online examination with 68%
accuracy. However, further investigation is required to understand the security of
activity based questions.
In their previous work, the authors conducted an online course to analyse usability,
security and privacy factors in an online examination context (Ullah et al. 2014a,
2012b, c). The overall findings of the study reported positive outcomes. However,
the following usability and security issues were identified. These issues were
identified in the text-based questions as discussed in the literature review above
(Just and Aspinall 2009a, c; Schechter et al. 2009).
& Questions with clarity, relevance and ambiguity issues were less usable. This
influenced efficiency, effectiveness and memorability.
& Weak question design could lead to successful guessing.
These findings were helpful in setting out a benchmark for future research including
the study reported in this paper.
2.4 Multiple-choice image-based questions
Our previous study revealed usability and security issues associated with the use of
text-based challenge questions due to question design (Ullah et al. 2014a). In response
to the risks and usability issues identified, multiple-choice image questions were
introduced for use in this study. The use of image authentication has been adopted
for a number of online services. For example, the Bank of America utilizes a site key
image combined with text-based challenge questions (Youll 2006). Renaud and Just
(2010) reported enhanced usability while using association-based image questions.
This method can be further classified into recall based, cue recall based and recognition
based schemes. In this study, we implemented recall based and recognition based image
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authentication (Ullah et al. 2014b). The description and background of these questions
is given below:
& Recall Image-based Questions: Recall is the ability to memorize items
without help. Shephard (1967) indicates that humans are better at recalling
images than words, which is driven by the Bpicture superiority effect^.
This system requires a user to recall and select their previously chosen
images.
& Recognition Image-based Questions: These rely upon an individual’s ability to
judge whether he/she has seen or selected an image before. It has been used in
various studies by asking users to select previously chosen images from a large
subset with distraction images (Brostoff and Sasse 2000; Hayashi et al. 2011; Ullah
et al. 2015).
& Cued Recall Image-based Questions: This approach relies upon an individual’s
ability to recall an image, however, it is aided with a cue to stimulate recollection of
a previous selection (Hayashi et al. 2011). This approach can be implemented using
text-based information stored by a user (Rabkin 2008) or automated cues created
programmatically (Wiedenbeck et al. 2005).
3 Research methodology
In this study, we implemented text-based and image-based challenge questions. A
profile based authentication approach was employed to implement challenge questions
in the learning and examination processes (Ullah et al. 2012a) as shown in Fig. 1. It was
achieved by developing and integrating the system in Modular Object Oriented Dis-
tributed Learning Environment (MOODLE). Using this approach, learners register
answers to pre-defined questions in order to access learning resources. A learner’s
profile is built during the learning process. In order to access an assessment activity, the
Fig. 1 Profile based authentication
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learner is required to authenticate and provide correct answers to a random subset of
challenge questions from his/her profile.
The study was organized in two phases described below.
3.1 Study phase – I usability evaluation
In the first phase, an online course was used involving remote students in order to
evaluate the usability of text-based and image-based questions using a profile based
authentication method as shown in Fig. 1. The following research methodology and
process were adopted for usability evaluation.
3.1.1 Usability test approach (methodology)
Some earlier studies (Just and Aspinall 2009c; Just 2004) have reported usability as one
of the major challenges in using challenge questions. A usability analysis is important
in evaluating how effectively security measures can be implemented. The following
usability attributes defined by the International Organization for Standards (ISO)
(Iso9241-11 1998) and described in the Quality in Use Measurement Model (QUIM)
(Seffah et al. 2001) were chosen:
& Efficiency: It is a usability metric defined by ISO, which can be evaluated
by measuring the completion time of each task and sub-tasks separately
(Seffah et al. 2001). A system is considered efficient, if users are able to
complete tasks in a reasonable time. In the context of this work, challenge
questions completion time is measured to compute the efficiency of the
proposed approach.
& Effectiveness: It is an important usability factor which indicates a degree of
completeness with which users achieve a specified task in a certain context
(Seffah et al. 2001). The effectiveness of questions was analyzed on the number
of correct and incorrect answers to challenge questions in order to report the
completion of authentication task and error rate.
& Recall or Memorability: An answer can be classified as memorable if it can be
easily recalled (Just 2004). In the context of this work, memorability was evaluated
based on the answers recalled during the authentication process. If a user’s answer
did not completely match with a previously registered answer, it is considered to be
the result of recall or memorability failure.
3.1.2 Usability testing using an online course (process)
Following is the description of research process in order to evaluate usability attributes
described in the research methodology above:
& Questions Design: Questions reported with usability and security issues in a
previous study (Ullah et al. 2014a) were replaced with alternatives giving a careful
design consideration to reduce ambiguity and clarity issues. Text-based and image-
based questions were classified into five themes: academic, favourite, personal, date
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and image. Image based questions were further classified into recall and recognition
questions as shown in Fig. 2. Text-based questions were based on the most common
types implemented by leading email providers for credential recovery. For example
AOL utilizes favourite and personal questions, Google uses a small set of personal
questions and Microsoft and Yahoo implement a combination of personal and
favourite questions (Schechter et al. 2009).
As shown in Fig. 2, recall image questions were presented as multiple-choice
questions and students were required to choose an answer during the learning
process, which was used for authentication during the examination. Recognition
image questions were also presented as multiple-choice questions. However, a
student was required to identify his/her previously chosen image, which was
presented with multiple distraction images.
Fig. 2 Image based questions
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& Course Setup: An online course in PHP and MYSQL was setup and deployed in
the MOODLE Learning Management System (LMS) on a remote web server. The
course contents were released on a daily basis to engage participants and increase
their interest and number of visits. A weekly online multiple-choice question
(MCQ) quiz was set up as a summative online examination. Participants were
recommended to invest 10 h weekly learning effort for 25 days in a span of
5 weeks.
& Participants Recruitment: An earlier study was conducted in a simulation environ-
ment. However, to understand the usability attributes in a real situation, an online
course was organized and offered free of cost on the University of Hertfordshire
online portal to attract students who were already enrolled on other distance
learning courses. Participants were required to have basic programming knowledge
in order to enroll. 70 students were recruited. The distribution of participants was
not uniform across countries and cities, but there was a good representation from a
diverse group of students from 9 countries. Of the 70 students, 50 (71%) students
were from the United Kingdom. 11(16%) students from Pakistan, 2(4%) students
from Malta and Nigeria, 1(1%) each from Ireland, Greece, India, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Togo took part. One of the disadvantages of the above distribution is
drawing conclusion using characteristics of the sample population. However, the
study was directed to a specific user group involved in distance learning.
& Student Registration: Guidance notes and an enrolment key for registration were
emailed to all participating students. Registration was a standard MOODLE sign up
process, which was essential to create login credentials to access the course. Upon
successful registration, students received their login-identifier and password.
& Online Learning Weeks 1–5: The course was presented over a period of 5 weeks. To
collect data for the evaluation of usability and security, the transactional information
including completion time of profile questions and challenge questions authentica-
tion results were stored in a database.
& Examination Weeks 1–5 Quizzes: The online course contained 5 quizzes released on
a weekly basis towards the end of each week. Only students completing the quizzes
were able to continue their study. Students were authenticated against their indi-
vidual profiles recorded earlier.
3.2 Study phase – II collusion abuse case
In the second phase, a simulation study was conducted to evaluate collusion attacks
when a text-based challenge questions approach is implemented. The following re-
search methodology and process were adopted for security evaluation.
3.2.1 Risk based security assessment (methodology)
A risk based assessment model was adapted to plan, test and mitigate security risks.
This model provides quantification of security level risks associated with various secure
operations. This approach focuses on the test of features and functions of artefacts
based on risks of their failure (Mcgraw 2004). An overview of the planning steps for
this is given below.
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& Identify Functions: The focus of challenge questions authentication in this study
was the security of online examinations; therefore, weekly quizzes in an online
course were identified as secure assets.
& Identify Risks: The ISO definition of risk is the Bprobability of occurrence of harm
and its effect on objectives^ (Purdy 2010). The security test in this study focused on
the risk of collusion attacks when the challenge questions authentication is
implemented.
& Identify Abuse Case: A collusion abuse case scenario was created and simulated
using a web-based application in order to evaluate the security of the challenge
questions approach, which is described later in this study.
3.2.2 Abuse case scenario simulation (process)
Phase –II of the study was organized to simulate an impersonation abuse case scenario
after completion of the online course. Description of the simulation process is given
below:
& Designing Challenge Questions: A total of 50 text-based challenge questions were
created to simulate an impersonation abuse case scenario. A subset of these text-
based questions was implemented in Phase –I of this research and the number of
questions was increased for better results.
& Online Simulation Databases: An online challenge questions database and web-
based application was setup to simulate impersonation. 50 challenge questions
designed above were uploaded to the web based database application. The web
based database application containing three different database sizes i.e. 20, 30, and
50, were hosted on a web server.
& Participants Recruitment: A total of 15 participants from four universities
i.e. University of Hertfordshire, Southampton University, Cardiff University,
University of South Wales and Institute of Management Sciences Pakistan
volunteered to take part in the simulation abuse case tests. Although, this
represents a small sample size, however, security testing is a specialist task
and therefore, researchers involved in computer science were invited to
collaborate. The participants were invited to help with simulating the im-
personation attack and make a genuine effort to test the security of chal-
lenge questions approach.
& Simulated Abuse Case Scenario: The following collusion abuse case scenario was
simulated sharing different number of questions and database sizes:
BA student is registered on an online course. The course uses challenge questions
approach for authentication of students in online examinations. The student is
due to write his final semester online test. He or she wants to boost his/her grades
and recruit a third party to impersonate and take the test. However, to satisfy the
challenge questions authentication, the student is required to share his/her
challenge questions and answers with the third party helper in order to help
with the impersonation. The third party helper would use the shared information
to answer the randomly presented challenge questions for authentication^
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Given the above scenario, this study simulated the following sharing on database sizes
containing 20, 30, and 50 questions. Different number of profile questions and answers
were shared as shown in Table 2:
The simulation process is described below starting with a guessing attack with no
answers shared using the database size 50:
1) A participant was asked to access the application and randomly guess answers to
50 challenge questions as shown in Table 2 and Fig. 3a.
To understand the influence of sharing using different database sizes, the following
sharing conditions were tested for three database sizes 20, 30 and 50 respectively in a
sequence shown in Table 2 and Fig. 3b. The researcher/moderator performed sharing
with participants.
2) Starting from the database size B20^ as shown in Table 2 and Fig. 3b, a total of B8^
challenge questions and answers were shared with a participant via email to
simulate impersonation.
Table 2 Collusion abuse case scenario: database size and questions shared
Database size (50)
1) 0 or no sharing: A student is unable to share any questions with a third party impersonator.
In an attempt to impersonate and access the online examination, the third
party helper uses random guessing to answer the challenge questions.
This attack was simulated on the largest database size (50).
Database size (20)
2) Share 8 questions A student shares 8 questions and answers of his Database size (20) with a
third party impersonator.
3) Share 12 questions A student shares 12 questions and answers of his Database size (20) with a
third party impersonator.
4) Share 20 questions A student shares 20 questions and answers of his Database size (20) with a
third party impersonator.
Database size (30)
5) Share 12 questions A student shares 12 questions and answers of his Database size (30) with a
third party impersonator.
6) Share 18 questions A student shares 18 questions and answers of his Database size (30) with a
third party impersonator.
7) Share 30 questions A student shares 30 questions and answers of his Database size (30) with a
third party impersonator.
Database size (50)
8) Share 20 questions A student shares 20 questions and answers of his Database size (50) with a
third party impersonator.
9) Share 30 questions A student shares 30 questions and answers of his Database size (50) with a
third party impersonator.
10) Share 50 questions A student shares 50 questions and answers of his Database size (50) with a
third party impersonator.
Educ Inf Technol
3) The participant accessed the database and answered B5^ challenge questions
randomly presented from BDatabase size (20)^ using the shared questions and
answers.
4) The number of shared questions was increased to B12^ and B20^ respectively.
5) The above steps were repeated for BDatabase size (30) and size (50)^ and the
number of questions shared.
Of the total 15 participants simulating the above scenarios, 10 participants answered the
challenge questions using an electronic or printed copy shared via email.
A total of 5 participants volunteered and answered the challenge questions by
memorising the answers from the shared email. They were not allowed to copy or
Fig. 3 Abuse case simulations
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see the shared email while answering the questions from memory. Data from the study
was stored in the respective database for analysis.
4 Usability results and analysis
Seventy participants registered answers to 2315 profile questions in phase –I of the
study during the course. The weekly quizzes were attempted by 48 participants who
answered 1347 challenge questions. The usability analysis is discussed below.
4.1 Efficiency
We evaluated the efficiency of challenge questions by computing completion times by
students on each visit to the course. The total number of profile questions collected was
higher than the number of challenge questions posed for authentication. A student
needed to access the course recurrently and the completion time of profile questions
presented during the course would be expected to relate to the efficiency. Mean scores
of the completion times are shown in Table 3.
A gradual decrease in the completion time of profile questions 74.87 s to 40.57 s is
shown in Table 3, which indicates an increased efficiency with increased number of
visits. In order to test the significance of any trend in the data presented in Table 3, a
one-way ANOVA was performed with linear contrasts. A significant trend was con-
firmed for completion time in participants’ multiple visits F (1,544) = 8.42, p < 0.01. A
Pearson correlation was computed to assess the direction of the trend on subsequent
visits (r = −0.171, n = 558, p < 0.01). The findings indicate a decrease in the completion
time with an increasing number of visits.
Table 3 Mean completion times
for profile questions
Visit No. Completion time in seconds
Mean SD N=Visitors
1 74.87 59.48 70
2 62.28 61.77 60
3 53.22 63.52 54
4 43.26 47.92 50
5 32.07 15.13 44
6 45.18 41.37 40
7 43.05 38.15 38
8 44.42 41.98 38
9 46.11 34.20 35
10 47.32 38.84 34
11 37.93 23.43 29
12 43.50 30.18 24
13 42.50 67.65 23
14 40.57 31.08 19
49.59 47.13 558
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4.2 Effectiveness of text-based questions
To examine the effectiveness of challenge questions, an analysis of the correct answers
to challenge questions during the quizzes was performed. We implemented an string-to-
string comparison algorithm for authentication purposes (Schechter et al. 2009; Ullah
et al. 2014a). Results in Table 4 show that, of the 890 text-based challenge questions
randomly presented to students, 583 (66%) were answered correctly during the au-
thentication process using an equality algorithm, which would increase to 74% if a
more relaxed algorithm was implemented. The relaxed algorithm compensates for
spelling mistakes and syntax variation. 307 (34%) answers were incorrect as a result
of recall and syntactic variation.
As shown in Table 4, text-based challenge questions were classified into four themes.
In order to test the significance of any differences in the means of correct responses to
text-based challenge questions shown in Table 5, a one-wayANOVA test of significance
was performed. The results of this analysis show that there was no significant difference
in the means of correct answers between different themes (p > 0.05).
The BAcademic^ theme in Table 4 shows 64% correct response. Ambiguous
academic questions resulted in failed authentication. The detailed sorting of incorrect
answers revealed a complete shift in students’ answers during learning and authenti-
cation. Some of these answers were semantically correct, however, not an exact match
for the purpose of authentication. The incorrect answers registered by participants in the
learning process resulted in failed authentication during all subsequent attempts in spite
of a correct answer during the examination process.
Challenge questions in the BDate^ theme shown in Table 4, received 72% correct
answers during authentication. The syntax variation of the date format can be a
usability challenge. Challenge question BDate of Birth^ received 50% correct answers.
Detailed sorting of answers revealed that a large number of answers were semantically
correct with a variation in the answer format. As an example, answers B09/04/90^ and
B09/04/1990^ submitted in learning and examinations phases were correct but penal-
ized for failing string-to-string match during authentication; however, this could be
prevented by enforcing validation rules or by using a different data entry method such
as a calendar/date picker.
Table 4 Effectiveness of text-based challenge questions
Questions theme Equality algorithm Failure reason Relaxed algorithm
Correct/Incorrect N (%)
N = number of answers
Syntactic
variation
Recall Correct/Incorrect N (%)
N = number of answers
Text-based questions
Academic 117(64%) / 67 (36%) 15 (22%) 52 (78%) 130 (71%) / 54 (29%)
Favourite 301(65%) / 162(35%) 31(19%) 131(81%) 321 (69%) / 142 (31%)
Personal 109 (66%) / 56 (34%) 17 (30%) 39 (70%) 128 (78%) / 37 (22%)
Date 56 (72%) / 22 (28%) 21 (96%) 1 (4%) 77 (99%) / 1 (1%)
Total 583(66%) / 307(34%) 84(27%) 223(73%) 656 (74%) / 234(26%)
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The authentication of challenge questions used a string-to-string comparison
method referred to as the equality algorithm. The algorithm penalized answers
with syntactic variation and spelling mistakes, which would otherwise be
considered correct if a more relaxed algorithm was used. The data in Table 4
columns 2 and 3 show results of authentication using an equality algorithm and
column 5 shows results if a more relaxed algorithm was used. The data of the
relaxed algorithm was compiled using a substring and distance algorithms
(Schechter et al. 2009). The results of a relaxed algorithm compensates for
syntactic variation such as date format, spelling mistakes and white spaces. A
paired sample t-test showed a significant difference in the effectiveness between
the equality (M = 66.12, SD = 12.6) and relaxed (M = 75.35, SD = 14.09) algo-
rithms conditions t (30) = −4.33; p < 0.01.
4.3 Effectiveness of image-based questions
The effectiveness results of both BRecall^ and BRecognition^ image-based challenge
questions are shown in Table 5.
The image questions are shown in Fig. 2. As discussed earlier, the BRecognition^
image questions were derived non-intrusively in the background from students’ an-
swers to their multiple-choice image-based questions. A student’s answer was used
with a random subset of distraction images. These distraction images were not shown to
Table 5 Effectiveness of image-based challenge questions
Question description Type Correct /Incorrect N (%)
N = number of answers
Recall based image questions
Pen Object 15 (79%) / 4 (21%)
Book Object 7 (70%) / 3 (30%)
Pen & Inkpot Object 10 (63%) / 6 (38%)
Examination Logo 15 (100%) / 0 (0%)
Science Logo 18 (100%) / 0 (0%)
Online learning Logo 16 (94%) / 1 (6%)
Graduation Logo 24 (73%) / 9 (27%)
Internet security Logo 10 (53%) / 9 (47%)
Peace Logo 17 (89%) / 2 (11%)
Fish Nature 20 (100%) / 0 (0%)
Flower Nature 12 (86%) / 2 (14%)
Deer Nature 20 (77%) / 6 (23%)
Bird Nature 8 (62%) / 5 (38%)
Sub total 192(80%)/47(20%)
Recognition based image questions
Select an image you’ve previously seen/chosen Mixed 197 (90%) / 21 (10%)
Sub total 197 (90%) / 21 (10%)
Grand total 389 (85%) / 68 (15%)
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participants previously. They were required to recognize their previously chosen image
from a set of distraction images.
Of the total of 457 image-based challenge questions, 389 (85%) were answered
correctly during authentication. The effectiveness result for the text-based questions
described above was 66% using the equality algorithm and 74% using the relaxed
algorithm. Implementation of multiple-choice questions addressed the issue of syntactic
variation, capitalization, formatting and spelling mistakes, which increased the effec-
tiveness. Results in Table 5 show that BRecall^ and BRecognition^ image-based
questions received 192 (80%) and 197 (90%) correct answers respectively.
Following section presents a comparative analysis of text-based and image-based
questions.
4.4 Comparison of effectiveness between text-based and image-based questions
The effectiveness of image-based questions was significantly better than the text-based
challenge questions (p < 0.01). In order to test the significance of any differences in the
means of correct answers between text and image questions shown in Tables 4 and 5, a
one-way ANOVA test of significance was performed. The results of this analysis
showed that there were significant differences in the means F (1, 42) = 13.5,
p < 0.01.The use of image-based questions resulted in better effectiveness by
minimizing usability problems such as syntactic variation, spacing, capitaliza-
tion, spelling mistakes and memorability.
In order to test the significance of any differences in the means of correct answers
between text and image questions shown in Tables 4 and 5 according to the equality
and relaxed algorithms, a one-way ANOVA test of significance was performed. The
results of this analysis showed that there were significant differences in the means
F (5, 72) = 6.11, p < 0.01. Post hoc comparisons of the groupings yielded the
following significant results.
Text-based (equality algorithm) x Image-based, mean difference (MD) = −14.33,
Standard Error (SE) = 4.94, p < 0.01 Text-based (equality algorithm) x Text-based
(Relaxed algorithm), MD= −9.2, SE = 3.39, p < 0.01. No other significant differences
were found in the post hoc comparisons. The findings indicate that the use of image-
based questions increased the effectiveness by addressing the issues related with
syntax, spellings, spacing and formatting. However, the use of a relaxed algorithm also
increased the effectiveness which compensated the stated issues. There was no signif-
icant difference in the effectiveness between image-based questions and text-based
questions using a relaxed algorithm.
The implementation of image-based questions is encouraging and set a new
direction for this research. In an earlier study, Renaud and Just (2010) reported a
13% increase in memorability while using association-based pictures in authentication.
Multiple-choice image questions indicate more potential and increased answer recall.
5 Security results and analysis
Tables 6 and 7 show the security analysis of an impersonation abuse case performed by
15 participants using three different database sizes. Results of the 10 participants, who
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answered challenge questions from an electronic or printed copy, are presented in
Table 6. Results of the 5 participants, who memorized the answers before responding
the challenge questions, are presented in Table 7.
5.1 The effect of Bnumber of questions shared^ on impersonation
In order to test the significance of any trend in the data presented in Table 6
for different numbers of sharing in an impersonation attack using database
size (20), size (30), and size (50), a one-way ANOVA was performed with
linear contrasts. A linear trend was found for all sharing conditions on
Database size (20), F (1, 36) = 293.8, p < 0.01, Database size (30), F (1,
36) = 507.6, p < 0.01, and Database size (50), F (1, 36) = 507.67, p < 0.01. A
Pearson correlation was performed on data presented in Table 6 to test the
direction of the trend for all sharing conditions on Database size (20), r = 0.94, n =
40, p < 0.01, Database size (30), r = 0.94, n = 40, p < 0.01 and Database size (50),
r = 0.93, n = 40, p < 0.01.
The above results show that an increase in the number of shared questions
has increased the number of correct answers in a collusion abuse case.
Figure 4 shows a strong linear trend for all sharing conditions using all
database sizes.
The findings revealed that an impersonation attack is more successful if a
student is able to share a large number of questions with a third party
impersonator. In the absence of monitoring or timing a user response, an
impersonator can answer challenge questions copying from a printed or elec-
tronic source shared by a student in order to authenticate. In the abuse case
simulation, challenge questions were randomized, however, the impersonator
was able to search and copy the correct answers from the shared information.
The findings revealed that the impersonator may circumvent the challenge
questions approach, irrespective of the size of database, if an online examina-
tion is not monitored or students are not restricted to answer the questions in a
limited time.
Table 7 Impersonation abuse case scenario: answers memorized for impersonation
Database
size (50)
Database size (20) Database size (30) Database size (50)
P# 0
*n = 50
8
n = 5
12
n = 5
20
n = 5
12
n = 5
18
n = 5
30
n = 5
20
n = 5
30
n = 5
50
n = 5
1 1(2%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 0(0%) 4(80%) 1(20%) 1(20%) 3(60%)
2 1(2%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 1(20%) 1(20%) 1(20%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 1(20%)
3 0(0%) 1(20%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 1(20%) 3(60%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 3(60%)
4 2(4%) 2(40%) 1(20%) 1(20%) 2(40%) 1(20%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 2(40%)
5 3(6%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 2(40%) 1(20%) 4(80%) 2(40%) 2(40%) 3(60%) 3(60%)
7(2.8%) 9(36%) 11(44%) 9(36%) 7(28%) 9(36%) 12(48%) 9(36%) 11(44%) 12(48%)
*n = number of questions presented
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5.2 The effect of Bdatabase size^ on impersonation attacks
This section provides an analysis on the BDatabase size^ and how this affects the
success of an impersonation attack. In order to test the significance of any trend in the
data presented in Table 8 using database size (20), size (30) and size (50) for all sharing
conditions, a one-way ANOVAwas performed with linear contrasts. A trend was found
for all database sizes (20), (30) and (50) F (1, 29) = 11.45, p < 0.01. A Pearson
correlation was performed on data presented in Table 8 to test the direction of the trend
on all database sizes for r = −0.559, n = 30, p < 0.01.
The above findings revealed that an impersonation attack was less successful with an
increase in the database size. The trend line in Fig. 5 shows a decrease in the number of
correct answers with an increase in the database size. Also, an increase in the database
Fig. 4 Trend analysis sharing vs correct answers using database sizes
Table 8 Impersonation using
database sizes: answers copied
for impersonation
P# Database (20) Database (30) Database (50)
1 12(80%) 9(60%) 9(60%)
2 11(73%) 11(73%) 9(60%)
3 12(80%) 8(53%) 9(60%)
4 9(60%) 9(60%) 7(47%)
5 11(73%) 10(67%) 7(47%)
6 10(67%) 10(67%) 10(67%)
7 9(60%) 8(53%) 9(60%)
8 11(73%) 10(67%) 9(60%)
9 10(67%) 9(60%) 8(53%)
10 9(60%) 9(60%) 10(67%)
104(69%) 93(62%) 87(58%)
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size decreases the probability of randomly getting the same subset of questions shared
by a student for impersonation. It is anticipated that an increase in the database size
would make it harder for a student to share all answers with a third party impersonator.
If answers to challenge questions are timed or monitored, it would be expected to
increase the difficulty for an impersonator to search for the correct answers from a
shared source for larger database sizes. As shown in Fig. 5, the impersonation attack
was less successful when participants had to memorise and answer the challenge
questions. It is discussed in more detail below.
5.3 The effect of answering challenge questions from memory
In a practical situation, it is anticipated that students would answer challenge
questions in a limited time. In the above discussion, participants were allowed
to search the shared information in order to answer the questions with no time
constraints. However, if answers to challenge questions are timed or the au-
thentication process is monitored, an impersonator would be required to mem-
orise the shared information. In order to test the significance of any trend in the
data presented in Table 7 for four sharing conditions in an impersonation attack
using Database size (20), size (30) and size (50), a one-way ANOVA was
performed with linear contrasts. A linear trend was found for all sharing
conditions on Database size (20), F (1, 16) = 17.8, p < 0.01, Database size
(30), F (1, 16) = 13.5, p < 0.01, and Database size (50), F (1, 16) = 30.09, p < 0.01. A
Pearson correlation was performed on data presented in Table 7 to test the direction of
the trend for all sharing conditions on Database size (20), r = 0.61, n = 20, p < 0.01,
Database size (30), r = 0.66, n = 20, p < 0.01 and Database size (50), r = 0.75, n =
20, p < 0.01.
The findings showed an increasing trend in correct answers with an increase in the
number of shared answers for impersonation. However, the number of correct answers
decreased when the impersonator answered the questions from memory. Figures 6, 7
and 8 show a difference in the correct answers for all sharing conditions using different
Fig. 5 Trend analysis: database sizes
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database sizes and the way impersonator answered these questions. It shows that for all
sharing conditions and database sizes, answers were less successful when
attempted from memory. In order to test the significance of any differences in
the means of correct answers between BAnswers copied for impersonation^ and
BAnswers Memorised for impersonation^, a one-way ANOVA test of signifi-
cance was performed on data shown in Tables 8 and 9. The results of this
analysis showed that there were significant differences in the means for Data-
base size (20) conditions F (1, 13) = 47.4; p < 0.01, Database size (30) condi-
tions F (1, 13) =43.18; p < 0.01, and Database size (50) conditions F (1, 13) =
12.47; p < 0.01. This indicates that if answers to challenge questions are timed
or an online examination process is monitored, it might discourage the imper-
sonator from searching a printed or electronic source for answers.
Fig. 6 Database size(20): electronic or printed source vs memory
Fig. 7 Database size(30): electronic or printed source vs memory
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6 Discussion
This work is part of an ongoing research to identify a secure and usable authentication
approach in order to mitigate collusion in online examinations. This study uses a two
phased approach to examine usability and security on two different user groups. The
usability analysis of text-based questions is not significantly different than other similar
studies discussed in Table 1. While the effectiveness of text-based questions increased
with improved question design from our previous study (Ullah et al. 2014a), the issues
contributing to incorrect answers such as syntactic variation, capitalization, incorrect
spellings, memorability remained unchanged. In their study, Just and Aspinall (2009a)
reported similar concerns for incorrect answers i.e. punctuation, capitalization and
memorability. In order to address these issues, this study provides a comparative
analysis between equality and relaxed algorithms. Our findings revealed that the
relaxed algorithm improved the usability of text-based questions significantly
(p < 0.01). This algorithm implemented an increased tolerance level and considered
answers with spelling mistakes, capitalization and syntactic variation as correct. Bailie
and Jortberg (2009) allowed two attempts to increase the tolerance level of challenge
questions approach with 92% accuracy. However, their study lacks detail on authenti-
cation protocol. In their influential study, Schechter et al. (2009) implemented substring
Fig. 8 Database size(50): electronic or printed source vs memory
Table 9 Impersonation using
database sizes: answers memo-
rized for impersonation
P# Database (20) Database (30) Database (50)
1 7(47%) 6(40%) 5(33%)
2 5(33%) 4(27%) 5(33%)
3 6(40%) 6(40%) 8(53%)
4 4(27%) 5(33%) 6(40%)
5 7(47%) 7(47%) 8(53%)
Total 29(39%) 28(37%) 32(43%)
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and distance algorithms which showed increase in correct answers. However, it also
increased the success of guessing attack during security analysis.
Many studies (Just and Aspinall 2009a; Schechter et al. 2009; Ullah et al.
2014a; Renaud and Just 2010) reported memorability as one of the key issues
with the use of text-based challenge questions. The results of usability analysis
in this study revealed that memorability contributed to 74% of the total
incorrect answers. The participants were unable to recall their answers correctly.
Schechter et al. (2009) reported 57% incorrect answers citing memorability
issue, however, 13% participants indicated that they registered bogus answers
to their challenge questions. In order to address these issues, this study utilized
multiple-choice image-based questions. The results revealed increased effective-
ness compared to text-based questions. The findings showed that BRecall^ and
BRecognition^ image-based questions received 192 (80%) and 197 (90%) cor-
rect answers respectively. There was a significant difference (p < 0.01) in the
effectiveness between image questions and text-based questions. Furthermore,
recognition based question were more useable as users had to recognized their
previous image selection, which was presented with a set of random distractor
images. In a similar study Renaud and Just (2010) achieved 13% increase in
memorability with associative picture-based authentication. This study utilised
image-based questions using three multiple-choice options, which implies 33%
probability of a correct random guess. However, an increase in the number of
multiple choice options will decrease the probability of random guessing.
Although, the use of image-based questions enhances the usability, however,
the above discussion shows a usability and security trade-off.
Previous research work on challenge questions focused largely on conven-
tional threats i.e. guessing attacks. This study investigates the potential use of
challenge questions to mitigate non-conventional impersonation threats. The
security analysis based on the abuse case scenario revealed that the success
of an impersonation attack was influenced by the number of answers shared
with a third party impersonator. There was a significant linear trend (p < 0.01),
when impersonators answered their challenge questions from a printed or
electronic copy of the shared questions. The number of correct answers de-
creased, when impersonators memorized and answered the questions to simulate
a scenario when an online examination is monitored or answers to challenge
questions timed. The response time is identified an important authentication
factor. The study also revealed that an increase in the database size decreases
the number of correct answers during a collusion attack. This indicates that an
increase in the profile size increases the resilience of the challenge questions
approach against collusion attacks.
In a practical scenario, the success of impersonation attack will depend upon the
ability of students to share maximum answers with third party impersonators. It can be
inferred from the findings that such attacks may be more successful for smaller profiles.
Since text-based questions are associated with individual’s personal information, it may
relatively easy for students to share such information with an impersonator particularly
in a high stake examination. A decrease in sharing personal information can influence
the impersonation. Image-based questions could be a potential alternative to discourage
students from sharing; however, this needs further investigation.
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7 Conclusion
This study presents a comparative analysis of usability and security between text-based
and image-based challenge questions in the context of online examinations. Text-based
questions were reported with common usability issues reported in previous research
including spelling mistakes, capitalization, spacing, and memorability. The use of
image-based questions increased usability results including efficiency and effective-
ness. It can be a usable and secure concept to prevent conventional security threats.
This may help universities and researchers to investigate the potential for using image-
based challenge question to mitigate security threats including collusion attack.
The security analysis based on the abuse case scenario revealed that the success of
an impersonation attack was influenced by the number of answers shared with a third
party impersonator, database size and the response time during authentication process.
Therefore, to mitigate impersonation, it is essential to implement question type which
minimizes the ability of students to share their credentials. The findings are not
sufficient to determine the student’s ability of sharing personal information. However,
it can be assumed that a student should be able to share personal information in a high-
stake process. Further research is warranted to understand individual’s ability of sharing
information with an impersonator in an online examination context.
Future research will explore other question types which are usable but minimizes the
risks of sharing in order to mitigate impersonation.
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